Inheritance  By, Through and From  an Adopted Person Under The New Wisconsin Statute by Taibl, William E.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 56
Issue 1 Fall 1972 Article 7
Inheritance "By, Through and From" an Adopted
Person Under The New Wisconsin Statute
William E. Taibl
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
William E. Taibl, Inheritance "By, Through and From" an Adopted Person Under The New Wisconsin Statute, 56 Marq. L. Rev. 119 (1972).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol56/iss1/7
INHERITANCE "BY, THROUGH AND FROM" AN
ADOPTED PERSON UNDER THE NEW WISCONSIN
STATUTE
The nature of the relationship between an adopted person and
his adoptive and natural parents and relatives has been the subject
of numerous legislative enactments and court decisions in Wiscon-
sin. Several excellent articles have analyzed the effects of many of
these developments;1 however, the enactment of section 851.51 of
the Wisconsin Statutes2 has dated these articles, and it provides the
basis for this new commentary.
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to analyze the effects of this newly
created statute in light of past developments, current trends and
practical problems. Due to the complexity of the issues involved,
this article will concentrate primarily on the following subsections
of section 851.51 of the Wisconsin Statutes:
(1) INHERITANCE RIGHTS BETWEEN ADOPTED PERSON AND
ADOPTIVE RELATIVES. A legally adopted person is treated as a
natural child of his adoptive parents for purposes of intestate
succession by, through and from the adopted person and for
purposes of any statute conferring rights upon children, issue or
relatives in connection with the law of intestate succession or
wills.
(2) INHERITANCE RIGHTS BETWEEN ADOPTED PERSON AND
NATURAL RELATIVES. A legally adopted person ceases to be
treated as a child of his natural parents for the same purposes,
except:
(a) If a natural parent marries or remarries and the child is
adopted by the stepparent, the child is treated as the child of his
natural parent for all purposes;
(b) If a natural parent of a legitimate child dies and the other
natural parent remarries and the child is adopted by the steppar-
ent, the child is treated as the child of the deceased natural parent
for purposes of inheritance through that parent and for purposes
i. Worthing, Inheritance and Testamentary Rights with Respect to Adopted Children,
153 Wis. L. REV. 38 [hereinafter cited as WORTHING]; Note, A Re-evaluation of Inheritance
and Testamentary Rights with Respect to Adopted Children in Wisconsin, 1956 Wis. L.
REV. 504 [hereinafter cited as RE-EVALUATION].
2. Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 339, § 26.
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of any statute conferring rights upon children, issue or relatives
of that parent under the law of intestate succession or wills.
Despite the desire to provide an article which can be used as a
foundation for the practical application of the subsections herein
treated, some historical and introductory material is essential to
clarify the structure and intent of the current statute.
It may be beneficial to initially outline briefly the six primary
problems of intestate succession as they are related to adoption:
1. Intestate succession by the adopted person from his adoptive
parents or from adoptive relatives through the adoptive parents
by way of representation.
2. Intestate succession through the adopted person from his
adoptive parents and their relatives (such as inheritance by chil-
dren of the adopted person).
3. Intestate succession from the adopted person or through the
adopted person (from his children) by the adoptive parents or
their relatives.
4. Intestate succession by the adopted person from his natural
parents or from natural relatives through the natural parents
(such as a natural aunt, uncle, or grandparent).
5. Intestate succession through the adopted person (as by his
children) from his natural parents or natural relatives through
the natural parents.
6. Intestate succession from the adopted person or through the
adopted person (from his children) by the natural parents or their
relatives.
The identification of these six problem areas is not intended to
be exclusive; however, these categories do provide a practical and
convenient foundation for this analysis and should be kept in mind
throughout this article.
II. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
Hole v. Robbins3 was an early case that established the Wis-
consin Supreme Court's initial position on the relationship of intes-
tate succession and adoption. In that case, the court applied its
interpretation of chapter 49 of the Wisconsin Statutes of 1858,1 and
3. 53 Wis. 514, 10 N.W. 617 (1881).
4. The pertinent sections of chapter 49 are:
Section 6. A child so adopted as aforesaid, shall be deemed, for the purpose of
inheritance and succession by such child, custody of the person and right of obedience
by such parent or parents by adoption, and all other legal consequences and incidents
of the natural relation of parents and children, the same to all intents and purposes
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concluded that an adopted child could inherit from his adoptive
parents, but the adoptive parents could not inherit from the child.
From the opinion in this case, it is apparent that Wisconsin ad-
hered to the common law principle that inheritance followed the
blood, and that absent express statutory provision to the contrary
the property would remain in the blood line. This interpretation
was consistent with the view that rights obtained from adoption
were purely statutory and required strict construction.
Subsequent to and consistent with Hole v. Robbins, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court heard and decided Lichter v. Thiers.5 There-
after, the dicta in that case was cited as authority for the strict
interpretation of the adoption statute and as authority for preclud-
ing an adopted child from inheriting from the kindred of his adop-
tive parents.' In 1925, in Estate of Bradley,7 the court faced the
issue of the right of an adopted child to inherit from his adoptive
kindred. The court held that such inheritance was not permitted,
reasoning that there was a distinction to be drawn between making
the adopted child an heir of his adoptive parents and an heir of his
other adoptive kindred, since the other kindred were not parties to
the adoption.
The strict adherence to consanguinity demonstrated by these
early cases began to fade subsequent to Bradley due to a revision
of the adoption statute.' The newly revised statute was first con-
strued in Estate of Hood? The court concluded that the new revi-
sion changed the descent of property of an adopted child from his
line of blood to his adoptive parents, their heirs and next of kin.
This statutory change and court interpretation was the first indica-
tion of a more liberal and practical treatment of the relationship
between intestate succession and adoption.
In 1934, the court rendered an opinion on a slightly different
as if such child had been born in lawful wedlock of such parent or parents by
adoption, saving only that such child shall not be deemed capable of taking property
expressly limited to the heirs of the body or bodies of such petitioner or petitioners.
Section 7. The natural parent or parents of such child shall be deprived by such
order of adoption of all legal rights whatsoever as respects such child, and such child
shall be freed from all legal obligations of maintenance and obedience as respects
such natural parent or parents.
5. 139 Wis. 481, 121 N.W. 153 (1909).
6. WORTHING, at 40. Note that the adopted child could still inherit from his adoptive
parents as indicated in Hole v. Robbins, 53 Wis. 514, 10 N.W. 617 (1881).
7. 185 Wis. 393, 201 N.W. 973 (1925).
8. Wis. STAT. § 4024 (1915); renumbered § 332.05 by Wis. Laws 1925, ch. 4; repealed
and re-enacted as Wis. STAT. § 322.07 (1929) by Wis. Laws 1929, ch. 439.
9. 206 Wis. 227, 239 N.W. 448 (1931).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
aspect of this statute. In Estate of Sauer,10 the court held that the
legislature did not intend to deny to an adopted child the right to
inheritfrom his natural parents. The court again spoke to this issue
of dual status for adopted children in 1951, in Estate of Ries.' In
that case it was again indicated that the adopted person did not lose
his right to inherit from his natural parents, but the court held that
the adopted child had no right of inheritance from any other natu-
ral relatives. The court then stated that "[t]he extent to which the
adopted child may have a dual status in matters of inheritance is
a question of public policy for the legislature, not for the court.' 2
The rule of the Ries case was subsequently changed in 1953,
by a legislative amendment to section 322.07(4).13 The effect of
this amendment was to allow the adopted child to inherit from his
natural kindred as well as from his natural parents. This perhaps
unwise legislation was strongly criticized for good reasons, as will
be seen later, by the Child Welfare Committee of the Legislative
Council in its 1955 report. 4
In 1945, the legislature attempted to rectify a rather unusual
situation which existed in another area of Wisconsin inheritance
and adoption law. Legislation was passed in an attempt to change
the rule of the Bradley case which had resulted in a situation
whereby kindred of adoptive parents could inherit from an adopted
child, but the adopted child could not inherit from such kindred. 5
However, the supreme court, in Estate of Matzke,"8 held that the
1945 change failed to accomplish its intended purpose. It appears
that this series of events in conjunction with the general piecemeal
development of Wisconsin's adoption law in this area led to a
complete revision of the adoption statute in 1947.17
The importance of this revision was its apparent attempt to
completely change the status of an adopted person. The statute
indicated that, "the effect of the order of adoption is to completely
10. 216 Wis. 289, 257 N.W. 28 (1934). See also, Parent and Child-Adoption Stat-
utes-Right of Adopted Child to Inherit From Natural Parents, 19 MARQ. L. REV. 50
(1934).
11. 259 Wis. 453, 49 N.W.2d 483 (1951), interpreting Wis. Laws 1947, ch. 218.
12. 259 Wis. 453, 459a (1951).
13. Wis. Laws 1953, ch. 398, § 1; § 322.07(4), prior to this amendment, read: "The
adopted person does not lose the right to inherit from his natural parents." The amendment
substituted the word "relatives" for "parents".
14. RE-EVALUATION, at 506.
15. Wis. Laws 1945, ch. 117; Worthing, at 44.
16. 250 Wis. 204, 26 N.W.2d 659 (1947).
17. Wis. Laws 1947, ch. 218.
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change the legal status of the adopted person from that of a child
of the natural parents to that of a child of the adoptive par-
ents. .... ,,"8 This relatively new approach to the concept and ef-
fect of adoption was approved by the supreme court in Estate of
Holcombe9 and again in Estate of Nelson.20 The legislative crea-
tion and the subsequent court ratification of this new legal status
conferred upon adopted persons provided a foundation for a subse-
quent statutory revision in 1955. Unfortunately, the 1969 revision
failed to adhere to the spirit of this logical and beneficial approach.
The 1955 legislative revision read as follows:
48.92 Effect of Adoption. (1) After the order of adoption is
entered the relation of parent and child and all the rights, duties
and other legal consequences of the natural relation of child and
parent shall thereafter exist between the adopted person and the
adoptive parents. The adopted person shall be entitled to inherit
real and personal property from and through the adoptive par-
ents in accordance with the statutes of descent and distribution,
and the adoptive parents shall be entitled to inherit real and
personal property from and through the adopted person in ac-
cordance with said statutes.
(2) After the order of adoption is entered the relationship of
parent and child between the adopted person and his natural
parents, unless the natural parent is the spouse of the adoptive
parent, shall be completely altered and all the rights, duties and
other legal consequences of the relationship shall cease to exist.21
The effects of this statute can be summarized as follows: The
adopted person could inherit from and through the adoptive par-
ents; the adoptive parents could inherit from and through the
adopted person; and the relationship between the adopted person
and his natural parents was terminated except as to a natural
parent who was also the spouse of the adoptive parent. It was
apparent from this statute that the legislature had made an earnest
18. Id. The single exception to this change of status was the retention of the right of an
adopted person to inherit from his natural parents.
19. 259 Wis. 642, 49 N.W.2d 914 (1951).
20. 266 Wis. 617, 64 N.W.2d 406 (1954). This modern trend received the following
favorable comment in the partial dissent in Estate of Cheaney, 266 Wis. 620, 627, 64
N.W.2d 408, 412 (1954):
This tendency of expanding the rights of adopted children is manifest in our recent
decisions of Estate of Holcombe. . . and Estate of Nelson . . . in contrast to the
less favorable attitude expressed in Estate of Bradley . . . and Estate of Matzke
21. Wis. STAT. § 48.92 (1955).
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attempt to consolidate the prior piecemeal development of Wicon-
sin's adoption law as it related to intestate succession. Perhaps the
most important aspect of this statute was its effective preservation
of the principle that adoption effected a change of status of an
adopted person. This factor received substantial comment in three
cases which arose subsequent to the adoption of section 48.92.
The supreme court in Estate of Roth22 indicated that the stat-
ute, with the one exception noted, terminated the rights of an
adopted person as next of kin to his natural parent notwithstanding
the fact that prior to 1955 such person was his natural parent's next
of kin under Wisconsin Statutes section 322.07 (1953).
In 1966, in Will of Adler, 2 the court made the following obser-
vation while discussing the current trend of thinking in relation to
adoption:
The tendency, desire and public policy in every adoption is to
completely absorb an adopted child into a family unit and to
make his status in fact indistinguishable from that of a natural
child, not only in his relationship with his adoptive parents, but
also with the general public and with relatives who are not imme-
diate members of the family circle.24
Subsequent to Roth and Adler, the court decided Estate of
Topel.25 In this case the court indicated that section 48.92 recast
the effect of adoption in general terms of status rather than in
terms of specific rights and further noted that,
The rationale [of Estate of Ries and Willof Adler] is that
322.07 completely changed the status of an adopted child by
cutting off the rights to inherit from and through natural kin and
substituting therefor the same inheritance rights from and
through the adoptive parents and kin.26
It is interesting to note here that the court in Topel denied
inheritance by three adopted children who claimed heirship by way
of representation (i.e. through their deceased natural father from
their natural paternal grandfather who died intestate); but the
court indicated that under the Proposed Wisconsin Probate Code,
Study Draft section 851.51(2),21 inheritance would have been al-
22. 25 Wis. 2d 528, 131 N.W.2d 286 (1964).
23. 30 Wis. 2d 250, 140 N.W.2d 219 (1966).
24. Id. at 260, 140 N.W.2d at 224.
25. 32 Wis. 2d 223, 145 N.W.2d 162 (1966).
26. Id. at 226, 145 N.W.2d at 164.
27. Id. at 227, 145 N.W.2d at 164.
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lowed. This point will be discussed later in further detail.
The foregoing material should indicate the difficulty the legisla-
ture and the courts have had in efficiently and effectively defining
the rights of an adopted person in relation to intestate succession
by, through and from such person.2 The reorganization of the
Wisconsin Probate Code in 1969 led to another attempt to further
refine the status of the law in this area. Following will be an
analysis of Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 339, sec. 26 (section 851.51 of the
Wisconsin Statutes) in light of the basic problem areas set out at
the beginning of this article.
III. THE CURRENT LAW
In light of the preceeding material, the current statutory lan-
guage and legislative intent expressed in section 851.51 should be
more easily understood. Also, it should be noted that perhaps the
most important aspect of the current statute is the far reaching
effect of the words "by, through and from" as they are used in
subsection (1), and the resulting implications which arise from
them in subsection (2).
Consistent with the earlier statutes and with a principle which
has been affirmed by Wisconsin case law, subsection (1) of section
851.51 preserves the right of intestate succession by the adopted
person from his adoptive parents. The following language would
seem to dictate this result:
A legally adopted person is treated as a natural child of his
adoptive parents for purposes of intestate succession by. . . the
adopted person. . . . (Emphasis added)
Closely related to this right is the right of intestate succession
by the adopted person from his other adoptive relatives. This prin-
ciple was not as readily accepted as the right of intestate succession
from the adoptive parents, as was evidenced in Wisconsin by the
result in the Bradley case. The nature of the law on this point
naturally varies according to the particular statutory language of
any given jurisdiction. Generally, however, those statutes which are
silent on the right of an adopted person to inherit from adoptive
kindred have been construed so as to deny the right. However,
where it is the legislative intent to avoid such a construction, var-
ious forms of specific statutory provisions have been relied on to
28. See also Eugene M. Haertle, Law of Adoption and Birth Records and Kroncke, A
Decade of Probate Law, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 82.
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create this right of inheritance. 9
In Wisconsin the following language in subsection (1) of section
851.51 can be relied on for establishing the right of intestate succes-
sion by an adopted person from his adoptive relatives:
A legally adopted person is treated as a natural child of his
adoptive parents for purposes of intestate succession by. . . the
adopted person and for purposes of any statute conferring the
rights upon children, issue or relatives in connection with the law
of intestate succession. . . . (Emphasis added)"
This conclusion is consistent with the trend of Wisconsin law sub-
sequent to Estate of Bradley and particularly with Wisconsin Stat-
utes section 48.92(1) (1955).31 It should also be noted that part of
the language relied on above indicates a reference to other statutes
conferring rights in connection with the law of intestate succession.
The principle statutes probably referred to under these particular
circumstances would be section 852.01 dealing with the basic rules
for intestate succession and section 852.03(1) concerning the mean-
ing of representation. The correlation of these statutes with section
851.51 will be treated in the last part of this article in more detail.
Subsection (1) of section 851.51 also provides for a right of
inheritance by the children of an adopted person from the adoptive
parents and relatives. For example, a child of the adopted person
may inherit from the adoptive parents or the other adoptive
kindred. This provision is consistent with the weight of authority
and is supported by reference to the right of representation.32 The
general reasoning relied on here is that where an adopted person
inherits from the adoptive parents and relatives and the adopted
person's child succeeds to the inheritance of his parents, such child
should naturally inherit per stirpes from his parent's adoptive par-
ents and relatives.33
29. Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1183 (1955). Part of this annotation indicates that the follow-
ing examples of statutory language have been construed as including the right to inherit
from adoptive relatives through the adoptive parents:
"from and through the adoptive parent"; "inherit from the relatives"; "inherit from
the kindred of such parent as well as from the parent"; and jurisdictions with "by,
through and from" statutory language.
30. The statutes referred to as conferring rights upon children, issue or relatives will be
treated later.
31. § 48.92(l) indicated in part that,
The adopted person shall be entitled to inherit real and personal property from and
through the adoptive parents in accordance with the statutes of descent and distribu-
tion. . . . (Emphasis added)




The supporting language in section 851.51 (1) for this right of
intestate succession is:
A legally adopted person is treated as a natural child of his
adoptive parents for purposes of intestate succession through
• . . the adopted person and for purposes of any statute confer-
ring rights upon children, issue or relatives in connection with the
law of intestate succession or wills. (Emphasis added)
This position is also supported by Wisconsin case law subsequent
to Estate of Matzke,34 and it is particularly in harmony with the
decision in Estate of Nelson31 and Wisconsin Statutes section
48.92 (1955).
To this point, the right of an adopted person or his children to
inherit from the adoptive parents or relatives has been established.
However, the reciprocal right of inheritance also exists. That is,
section 851.51(1) permits intestate succession from the adopted
person or through the adopted person (as from his children) by the
adoptive parents or relatives.
This principle was recognized early by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Estate of Hood" and was apparent in the various legisla-
tive changes of the statutory language since 1929. Wisconsin Stat-
utes section 48.92(1) (1955), attempted to make this right of inheri-
tance abundantly clear by the following language:
[T]he adoptive parents shall be entitled to inherit real and
personal property from and through the adopted person. ...
However, an apparent oversight by the legislature resulted in a
denial of such inheritance by adoptive relatives, contrary to estab-
lished legislative and case law precedent. This inconsistent situa-
tion arose due to the legislature's use of the words "adoptive par-
ents" rather than "adoptive relatives" or "adoptive kindred" in the
above-quoted language. The current statute has rectified this over-
sight by consolidating the inheritance rights of both the adoptive
kindred and the adopted person with the use of "by, through and
from" in conjunction with its reference to other statutes "confer-
ring rights upon children, issue or relatives." It should also be
noted that such inheritance is consistent with the principle that an
adoption completely changes the status of an adopted person by
substituting for his rights of inheritance from and through his natu-
34. 250 Wis. 204, 26 N.W.2d 659 (1947).
35. 266 Wis. 617, 64 N.W.2d 406 (1954).
36. 206 Wis. 227, 239 N.W. 448 (1931).
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ral parents and kindred the right to inherit from and through his
adoptive parents and kindred.
The introductory language of subsection (2) of section 851.51
indicates that "[a] legally adopted person ceases to be treated as a
child of his natural parents for the same purposes ... ." It would
appear that it was the legislative intent that this language would
sever completely the relationship between the adopted person and
his natural parents for the purposes of inheritance. This conclusion
is based on the fact that the legislature, as evidenced by the subse-
quent language, apparently saw the necessity of expressly estab-
lishing several exceptions to the broad introductory language. If
this was in fact the intent of the legislature, it is then possible to
logically and more precisely determine the meaning of the phrase
"for the same purposes" found in the introductory language.
This phrase apparently was used to indicate the changed status
which resulted from the adoption. The "purposes" referred to
would logically seem to be thos established in subsection (1); and
as the earlier material indicated, the purposes of this subsection
were to establish inheritance rights between the adopted person
and the adoptive parents and relatives consistent with those found
in a natural relationship. Assuming then that these conclusions do
represent the intent and actual effect of subsection (1) and the
introductory language of subsection (2), this analysis will now turn
to the two exceptions which the legislature established in regard to
the inheritance rights between the adopted person and his natural
parents and relatives.
As was indicated earlier, prior statutory and case law in Wis-
consin reflected a reluctance to sever inheritance rights related to
the bloodlines of an adopted person.37 The supreme court indi-
cated that a modification of these inheritance rights would require
a clear expression of legislative intent to that effect .3 This position
was consistent with a great number of jurisdictions; and many of
them indicated that despite the fact that the dominant feature of a
particular statute was to establish an adopted child as an heir of
the adoptive parents, absent a reference to the inheritance rights
from the natural parents, the statute would not be construed as
depriving the child of that inheritance.39
In light of these principles and the analysis of the introductory
37. See notes 7, 10, 11 and accompanying text supra.
38. id.
39. Annot. 37 A.L.R.2d 333 (1954).
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language in section 851.51(2), it becomes clear that the Wisconsin
legislature would have effectively severed the inheritance rights
between the adopted person and his natural parents had it enacted
only the introductory language. Total dissolution of these rights,
however, would not have been practical under many circumstan-
ces; therefore, several exceptions to the broad introductory lan-
guage in section 851.51(2) were created.
Subsection (2)(a) apparently maintains the adopted child's rela-
tionship with his natural parent for all purposes of inheritance
should that parent be the spouse of the adopting stepparent." This
subsection is the broader of the two exceptions created, yet it does
demand compliance with specific conditions which do require some
clarification.
The first condition indicated is that the natural parent must
either marry or remarry. This language was apparently intended
to encompass three distinct fact situations: 1) marriage subsequent
to the birth of a child born out of wedlock; 2) remarriage after the
death of the other natural parent; 3) remarriage subsequent to a
divorce. Under each of these situations, should the spouse of the
natural parent adopt the child, the child will continue to be treated
as the child of the natural parent despite the introductory language
found in subsection (2). Note then that the second condition re-
quired for the operation of this subsection is the adoption of the
child of such natural parent by the stepparent.
Once these conditions are met the effect of section 851.51 (2)(a)
is to maintain the natural relationship between the adopted child
and the natural parent "for all purposes." The broad language used
here indicates a probable legislative intent to avoid any possible
disruption of the continuing natural ties between the adopted child
and his natural parent as well as the natural relatives of the
parent."
Subsection (b) of the Section 851.51(2) establishes the second
exception to the introductory language. Briefly, this provision indi-
40. As to this and other related points see Binavince, Adoption and the Law of Descent
and Distribution: A Comparative Study and a Proposal For Model Legislation, 51
CORNELL L.Q. 150 (1966).
4 1. In comparing the current subsection with its predecessor, it is apparent that the new
subsection is a substantial improvement over the less explicit wording found in Wis.
STAT. § 48.92(2) (1955):
After the order of adoption is entered the relationship of parent and child between
the adopted person and his natural parents, unless the natural parent is the spouse
of the adoptive parent, shall be completely altered and all the rights, duties and other
legal consequences of the relationship shall cease to exist.
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cates that the adopted child is the child of a deceased natural
parent for purposes of inheritance through that parent. The con-
struction of this subsection also indicates a narrower application
than that of subsection (2)(a).
This portion of the statute would only apply under the follow-
ing circumstances:
1) after the death of a natural parent of a legitimate child, and
2) the remarriage of the other natural parent, and
3) the stepparent's adoption of the child.
If all of these conditions are met, the statute indicates that the
"child is treated as the child of the deceased natural parent for
purposes of inheritance through that parent and for purposes of
any statute conferring rights upon children, issue or relatives of
that parent under the law of intestate succession or
wills."(Emphasis added.)
It is readily apparent from this language that this subsection
reestablishes the inheritance rights between the adopted child and
the kindred of the deceased natural parent. Whether or not this
exception is wise remains to be seen. However, there are presently
more valid and practical reasons against such a provision than
there are supporting it.12
Initially, it should be noted that such a provision is contrary
to the modern theories of adoption. That is, it is inconsistent with
public policy as expressed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Will
of Adler 3 and with the new status theory expressed by the court
in Estate of Topel" and implied by the legislature in Wisconsin
Statutes section 48.92 (1955). The courts and the legislature have
labored hard and long at creating a logical, practical and efficient
method of treating the inheritance rights of an adopted person.
This laborious task could have been put to rest if the legislature
had not enacted the exception found in section 851.51 (2)(b).
In Estate of Topel, the court cited with apparent approval a
1955 Legislative Council report45 which indicated several reasons
in support of severing the ties between the adopted person and his
natural kindred under the circumstances contemplated by subsec-
tion (2)(b). These reasons may be summarized as follows:
42. Frantz v. Florence, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 222, 131 N.E.2d 630 (1954), Adoption-Effect
on Inheritance Rights From Natural Parents, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1956).
43. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
44. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
45. Wisconsin Legislative Council, 1955 Report, Children's Code, vol. VI, part I, p. 36,
cited at 32 Wis. 2d 223, 228, 145 N.W.2d 162, 165 (1966).
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1) Inheritance from natural relatives would destroy the protec-
tion afforded an adopted child by the secrecy of the adoption
records.
2) Settling estates would become more difficult due to the need
to trace adopted relatives of a deceased natural relative and natu-
ral relatives of a deceased adopted person.
3) If a natural relative is wealthy, he would probably die tes-
tate, and the statute would be of little value to the adopted child.
It is apparent that the first two arguments are stronger than the
third, and when they are coupled with the contemporary view of
adoption and the new status theory, a rather significant argument
exists in favor of denying the rights of inheritance provided for in
subsection (2)(b). 6 One further argument can be made in favor of
denying this right of inheritance through a deceased natural parent.
It has been noted in several jurisdictions that inheritance in two
capacities from one estate can arise from a statute permitting in-
heritance from or through both natural and adoptive parents. 7
This inequitable situation, which could result in double inheritance
by an adopted child, is substantially, but not totally, eliminated in
Wisconsin by the conditional language of section 851.51 (2)(a) and
(b).
In the areas where dual inheritance would normally arise,
subsections (2)(a) and (b) would generally operate to avoid it due
to the requirements of the remarriage of the natural parent and the
subsequent adoption by the stepparent. For example, these require-
ments avoid the creation of inheritance rights between the adopted
child and his natural relatives should that child be adopted by his
grandparents, and in most other situations." However, it does not
deny these rights if the child is adopted by a relative of a deceased
parent who marries the surviving parent of the child. 9 Although it
46. See Epstein, Inheritance Rights of an Adopted Child in Texas, 1968 HOUSTON L.
REv. 350, for similar supporting arguments against such rights of inheritance. See also note
40 and accompanying text supra; Inheritance By, Through and From an Adopted Child, 9
ALA. L. REv. 35 (1956); and The Adopted Child's Inheritance From Intestate Natural
Parents. 55 ALA. L. REV. 739 (1970).
47. Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 333 (1954). Following is one example of how such dual inheri-
tance can arise: A, an orphan, is adopted by his grandparent, B; B dies intestate and is
survived by A and a natural child C. A is both a surviving child (by adoption) and a child
of a deceased child (A's natural parent); therefore, under an appropriate statute A would
take one share as a child of B and one share by representation as a child of his deceased
natural parent.
48. The example in note 47 would not apply in Wisconsin.
49. Following is one possible example: C is the child of F and W, F dies and W marries
F2, the brother of F. F2 adopts C and has a natural child, C2, by his marriage to W.
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is apparent that such a situation will not often arise, there is no
cogent reason for leaving the door open to the inequitable situation
of dual inheritance which could result, thereby placing an adopted
child in a better position than a natural child. 50
Therefore, for the reasons indicated, it is hoped that the legisla-
ture will take affirmative action to remove the single flaw in an
otherwise effective and efficient statute. The repeal of section
851.51(2)(b) would accomplish this end and place this statute in
harmony with the contemporary and practical views of adoption
previously expressed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the
legislature.
There are two remaining areas to be discussed concerning the
interrelationship of inheritance rights, adoption and natural rela-
tives. First to be considered are the rights of intestate succession
through the adopted person (as by his child) from his natural par-
ents or from his natural relatives through the natural parents. The
two possibilities indicated by this statement fall within the opera-
tion of section 851.51(2)(a) and section 851.51(2)(b).
Section 851.51(2)(a) would apparently permit inheritance by
the children of an adopted child from or through a natural parent
who marries or remarries notwithstanding the adoption by the
stepparent of the natural child of this parent. This conclusion is
based on the broad language and scope of subsection (2)(a) as
indicated earlier.
Section 851.51 (2)(b) indicates that a deceased adopted person's
children could inherit through him from his natural relatives not-
withstanding the adoption. This result is supported by the follow-
ing language contained in subsection (2)(b):
[T]he child is treated as the child of the deceased natural parent
for purposes of inheritance through that parent and for purposes
of any statute conferring rights upon children, issue or relatives
of that parent under the law of intestate succession or wills.
(Emphasis added)
Subsequent to the death of F2, GF, the father of F and F2, dies intestate leaving no surviving
spouse. Under § 851.51(1) and § 852.01(1)(b), C and C2 would each take a interest in
GF's estate (through F2). However, by the addition of § 851.51(2)(b), C would take of
the estate by representation through the deceased F and of the estate as an adopted child
of F2; therefore, C would take 3/ and C2 of GF's estate.
50. See Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession By and From the Adopted Child, 28 WASH.
U.L.Q. 221 (1943), which indicates generally that the purpose of adoption is to afford the
child the status of a natural child and not to give the adopted child an undue advantage
resulting from dual inheritance.
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COMMENTS
It should be noted that the legislature has again permitted a
natural relationship to interfere with the new status which was to
have been created subsequent to an adoption, and as a result the
same criticisms of such a situation which were mentioned earlier
could be restated here.
Intestate succession from the adopted person or through the
adopted person (from his children) by the natural parents or their
relatives represents the last area of discussion related to inheritance
rights between adopted persons and their natural relatives.
As would only seem practical and logical, section 851.51(2)(a)
would apparently permit inheritance from and through the adopted
child by both the natural parent and the natural relatives of that
parent. This result is again evident from the broad implications
previously discussed arising from the use of the words "for all
purposes" at the end of this paragraph.
Section 851.51(2)(b) would also relate to this situation and
would indicate support for the proposition that inheritance rights
would exist in behalf of the natural relatives through the deceased
natural parent from the subsequently adopted natural children of
that parent. The language of subsection (2)(b) in conjunction with
the previously discussed double use of "through" in section
851.51(1)51 would seem to necessitate this conclusion in order to
maintain a consistent interpretation of the language used within
this statute as drafted. The nature of this result is again criticized
for failing to sever the relationship between an adopted person and
his issue, and the natural relatives of the deceased natural parent.
Before leaving this discussion of the elements and applications
of the various subsections of section 851.51, it should be noted that
these statutory provisions apply only subsequent to a legal adop-
tion. The necessity of a legal adoption arises from the introductory
language in subsections (1) and (2), "a legally adopted per-
son. . . .", and from several Wisconsin Supreme Court cases.52
Therefore, an adoption that is legally defective or an alleged "equi-
table adoption" would not support the application of this statute.
IV. STATUTORY CORRELATIONS
The last portion of this article will briefly identify some of the
possible effects section 851.51 may have on other statutes related
51. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
52. St. Vincent's Infant Asylum v. Central Wis. T. Co., 189 Wis. 483, 206 N.W. 921
(1926), Will of Mathews, 198 Wis. 128, 223 N.W. 434 (1929), and Estate of Cheaney, 266
Wis. 620, 64 N.W.2d 408 (1954).
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to the law of intestate succession or wills.
The adoption of section 851.51 was accompanied by an amend-
ment of section 48.92 in the Children's Code. The last sentence of
subsection (1), relating to inheritance rights after adoption, was
deleted, and subsection (3) was created to read:
Rights of inheritance by, from and through an adopted child are
governed by s. 851.51.11
These amendments made the effects of adoption on inheritance
and wills a part of the probate statutes, thereby avoiding their
needless segregation in the Children's Code.
Section 851.13 of the Wisconsin Statutes defines "issue" in the
following manner and thereby expressly includes within its defini-
tion an adopted child:
"Issue" means children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and
lineal descendants of more remote degrees, including those who
occupy that relation by reason by adoption under s. 851.51 ...
From the language of section 851.5111 and section 851.13, it
becomes apparent that section 852.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes is
directly affected by and directly affects the provisions contained in
section 851.5 1. Section 852.01 establishes the basic rules for intes-
tate succession; and, when read in conjunction with section 851.5 1,
the scope of the inheritance rights established or preserved by that
section becomes apparent as discussed earlier.
By necessity, application of section 852.01 will often require
reference to section 852.03(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes, which
establishes the meaning of representation. The provisions of these
two statutes as well as the statutory definition of "issue" are essen-
tial for a complete understanding of the effects of the language
used in section 851.51.
In addition to the above statutes, there are several statutes
which are not essential to an understanding of section 851.51, but
53. Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 339, §§ I and 2. There is no apparent reason for or effect from
the changed order of "by, from and through" as it appears here and "by, through and from"
as it appears in § 851.51(1).
54. (1) A legally adopted person is treated as a natural child of his adoptive
parents . . . for purposes of any statute conferring rights upon children, issue or
relatives in connection with the law of intestate succession . . . (2) . . . treated as a
child of his natural parents for the same purposes . . . (a) . . . treated as the child
of his natural parent for all purposes; (b) . . . for purposes of any statute conferring




which are directly affected by its provisions.
Section 853.27, the anti-lapse statute, permits the issue of a
deceased relative to take the same interest as the relative would
have taken had the relative survived the testator of a will in which
he was a beneficiary. Sections 851.51 and 851.13 apparently would
combine to permit an adopted child of the deceased relative to
represent such relative for the purposes of this statute. Further-
more, there is no reason to restrict the relationship of these sections
to the particular situation just noted, since sections 851.51 and
853.13 would remain applicable for the benefit of any adopted
person within the provisions and definitions therein indicated.
Section 853.25, concerning the unintentional failure of a testa-
tor to provide for his issue, makes specific reference to adopted
children and grants them the protections of its provisions. This
specific reference to adopted children avoids the necessity of reli-
ance on section 851.51, but it does indicate again the legislative
intent to treat the adopted child as a natural child of his adoptive
parents.
Section 851.51 would also have an effect on the following provi-
sions of section 853.11(2):
A will is revoked by the subsequent marriage of the testator if
the testotor is survived by his spouse unless:
(a) The will . . . makes provision for issue of the dece-
dent. ...
By applying section 851.51 to the following fact situation and in
light of the provisions noted above, it would appear that the adop-
tion of the child would have the effect of preventing the revocation
of W's will:
H and W adopt C. Subsequent to the adoption, H dies and W
drafts a will indicating her "issue" as beneficiaries. W then remar-
ries and dies prior to her second spouse and C.
As already indicated, the provision for "issue" and the exist-
ence of the adopted child would apparently prevent the revocation
of the will by the subsequent marriage; however, unlike the pre-
vious situations discussed in this article, subsection (3) of section
851.51 should be relied on for this result. The necessity for the
reliance on this subsection does not arise from the inability of
subsections (1) or (2) to protect the rights of the adopted child, but
instead it arises from the type of fact situation to which section
853.1 l(2)(a) applies. It is difficult to imagine a situation wherein
section 853.11(2) would apply that did not require the presence of
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a class gift. Therefore, the application of subsection (3), specifi-
cally referring to the construction of class gifts as including
adopted persons, would seem to be required.
This brief discussion of related statutes was not intended to be
an analysis of all the possible situations under which section 851.51
may have an effect. It does, however, provide an indication of the
broad scope of this statute and the importance of its careful consid-
eration.
V. CONCLUSION
The enactment of this statute has nearly concluded a long his-
tory of legislative and judicial commentary on the status of
adopted persons for purposes of inheritance and other related mat-
ters. This article has attempted to point out the strengths and
weaknesses of the current statute in addition to providing a founda-
tion for the practical application of its provisions. It is hoped that
the comments and criticisms have been constructive, and that the
legislature will eliminate the single weakness still remaining in this
area by repealing section 851.51 (2)(b), thereby conferring upon the
adopted person the new status argued for by the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court and the other authorities cited.
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